PepsiCo's 180-Day Reset: What Leaders Stopped Rewarding
PepsiCo South America's 50% accident-ratio reduction shows why safety leaders must change the decisions and incentives behind performance.

Key takeaways
- 01Audit the 180-day plan against control verification, escalation speed, and ownership instead of treating a 50% reduction as complete proof.
- 02Separate PepsiCo's documented result from unverified site-level details, because credible safety leadership states both what the case proves and what it cannot prove.
- 03Reward leaders who restore weak barriers and escalate exposure early, even when those decisions temporarily make performance dashboards look less comfortable.
- 04Measure the distance between written expectations and observed work across locations, since a regional result can conceal local variation in control reliability.
- 05Join the Headline Podcast conversation to keep leadership, safety decisions, and better workplaces connected beyond the metric.
PepsiCo South America reduced its accident ratio by 50% in six months under a 180-day safety plan, according to Andreza Araujo's documented professional profile. The striking part is not the percentage by itself. It is the leadership question behind it. What did executives stop rewarding when the old operating rhythm no longer produced safe work?
This case matters because a metric can improve while the system that produced it remains fragile. A lower accident ratio is useful evidence, but it does not prove that leaders have improved control ownership, field verification, or the quality of decisions made under production pressure. The 180-day result is best read as a case about leadership choices, not as a universal promise that one program will produce the same number elsewhere.
Initial scenario
The documented PepsiCo South America case began inside a large regional operation that covered 7 countries, 30 factories, and 168 distribution centers. The safety plan had 180 days to change performance, which made leadership cadence as important as technical design.
That scale changes the management problem. A local plant can often correct a weak control through direct observation, while a regional network must make expectations visible across different operating conditions, managers, and workforces. If the center sends only a target, each site interprets the target through its own habits. If leaders define the decisions that must change, local action becomes easier to compare.
Andreza's professional profile records a 50% reduction in the accident ratio in six months during her PepsiCo South America Foods tenure. The same profile identifies the regional footprint as 7 countries, 30 factories, and 168 distribution centers. Those are the facts available for the case. They do not justify inventing a site-level story, a fictional intervention, or a claim that every incident disappeared.
The useful question is therefore narrower. Which leadership behaviors make a time-bound safety reset credible when the operation is too distributed for senior leaders to supervise every task?
Why was the 50% result not enough?
A 50% reduction is a measured result, not a complete diagnosis. Leaders still need to test whether reporting quality, control execution, and escalation behavior improved alongside the headline metric.
OSHA's recommended safety and health program approach places management leadership, worker participation, hazard identification, hazard prevention, education, evaluation, and communication inside one operating system. That structure matters because a lagging number cannot show whether the controls that should prevent serious harm are actually working.
ISO 45001:2018 also treats leadership, worker participation, planning, operational control, and performance evaluation as connected parts of an occupational health and safety management system. A result that is separated from those elements can create false confidence, especially when leaders reward the number more visibly than the decisions that shape it.
This is why the PepsiCo case should not be reduced to a motivational slogan. The documented result gives executives a reason to study the operating choices around the plan. It does not give them permission to copy a percentage target into a different business and call that strategy.
Decision
The central decision in a credible reset is to stop rewarding activity that looks safe in a report while leaving operating ownership unchanged.
That does not mean ignoring the accident ratio. It means changing what the ratio is allowed to do. A board or executive team can use it as a signal that deserves investigation, while requiring leaders to show which high-risk controls were verified, which overdue actions were closed, and which decisions were escalated before exposure increased.
The distinction is important because incentives shape attention. If a manager is praised for a green dashboard but not questioned about unverified machine guarding, overdue maintenance, or repeated permit exceptions, the organization has taught that presentation quality outranks control quality. A reset must reverse that lesson.
The decision also needs a clear owner. The Headline Podcast blog's discussion of risk decisions with no owner is relevant here because distributed operations lose time when everyone can comment but nobody must decide, verify, and escalate.
| Old leadership signal | Reset leadership signal |
|---|---|
| Green monthly accident ratio | Green ratio plus evidence that critical controls were verified |
| Training completion percentage | Observed competence in the work where exposure exists |
| Closed action count | Closed action with proof that the risk pathway changed |
| Silence after a target is issued | Early escalation when a target conflicts with safe execution |
Execution
Execution becomes credible when leaders translate the reset into a repeatable review rhythm that connects regional expectations with local evidence.
The available PepsiCo record confirms the 180-day plan and the measured result, but it does not publish a complete site-by-site playbook. A responsible article must preserve that boundary. The practical lesson is not to invent four steps and attach them to the case. It is to identify the evidence a future leader would need before claiming that a similar reset worked.
That evidence should include the operating conditions that matter most. Leaders can ask which controls were selected, who owned each control, how often verification occurred, what happened when a control failed, and whether workers could escalate a concern without waiting for a monthly meeting. The answers create a chain from executive intent to field proof.
In a network spanning 7 countries, 30 factories, and 168 distribution centers, that chain also needs a common language. The local form can vary, but the decision rights should not. A plant manager should know which risk can be accepted locally, which requires regional support, and which must stop work until the barrier is restored.
The Headline framework on fearless influence in safety helps explain the human side of this execution problem. Senior leaders may set direction, but supervisors and workers often move the decision through the last operational mile. Their influence must be supported by clear boundaries rather than treated as informal heroics.
Measured result
The measured result was a 50% reduction in accident ratio over six months, achieved within a 180-day safety plan in PepsiCo South America Foods.
That result is meaningful because the time window is explicit. It is also limited because the available source does not provide the baseline denominator, the incident definition, the confidence interval, or a public breakdown by country, facility, or exposure type. Precision requires saying what the case proves and what it does not prove.
The case proves that a large regional operation associated with Andreza's tenure recorded a 50% accident-ratio reduction in six months. It does not prove that the percentage came from training alone, that the same intervention would work in a different sector, or that lagging indicators are sufficient for executive assurance.
Leaders should pair the result with forward-looking tests. The ISO 45001:2018 management-system structure supports this logic by connecting performance evaluation with operational control, participation, and continual improvement. The OSHA safety-management guidance makes a similar practical point by treating evaluation as part of the program rather than as a final presentation.
What should leaders measure next?
After an accident-ratio improvement, leaders should measure control reliability, escalation speed, action quality, and the distance between written expectations and observed work.
The first test is control reliability. A control is not reliable because a procedure exists. It is reliable when the responsible role can demonstrate that the barrier is present, understood, maintained, and used under normal production pressure.
The second test is escalation speed. A concern that reaches the right decision-maker after exposure has accumulated is not an early-warning system. Track when a concern was raised, when ownership was assigned, when a decision was made, and when the field received confirmation.
The third test is action quality. Counting closures rewards volume. Reviewing whether the action changed the pathway that allowed the exposure rewards learning that can be verified. This distinction is especially important when leaders face a six-month expectation and are tempted to close easy actions first.
The fourth test is worker voice. The International Labour Organization describes worker participation as a core part of occupational safety and health management. In practice, the question is whether people closest to the work can challenge a weak control before the dashboard shows a consequence. That signal belongs in the executive review.
Generalizable lessons
The PepsiCo case offers five transferable lessons, provided leaders treat its 50% result as evidence to investigate rather than a target to imitate.
- Keep the clock visible. A 180-day plan creates urgency, but urgency must be connected to staged evidence rather than a final percentage.
- Separate outcome from explanation. The accident ratio tells leaders what changed. Verification, escalation, and ownership help explain why.
- Reward the decision that protects exposure. A manager who stops a weak process may be creating better safety performance even before a lagging metric moves.
- Use one governance language across sites. Local execution needs room, while ownership and escalation thresholds need clarity.
- Publish the limits of the case. A credible result becomes more useful when leaders state which details remain unverified.
A lower accident ratio should increase the quality of leadership questions, not end them. The next serious exposure may be waiting in a control that nobody has verified since the metric improved.
What to apply in your operation
Start with a 30-day executive review that tests whether the decisions behind your safety metric are changing in the field.
Choose one safety-critical exposure and identify the executive owner, the operational owner, the verification method, and the escalation threshold. Then compare the written expectation with evidence from two work locations, because a regional dashboard can hide local variation.
Ask leaders to review one decision that was delayed, one control that was accepted without proof, and one concern that reached the meeting only after the exposure had passed. Those examples reveal more about operating discipline than a green presentation slide, particularly when the organization has recently celebrated a large reduction.
At day 30, report the evidence in four lines. State what improved, what remains uncertain, which owner must act, and when the field will verify the change. This format keeps the reset connected to decisions and prevents a successful number from becoming a substitute for assurance.
Why this case still matters
Andreza Araujo's PepsiCo South America result is a useful case because it combines a clear time window, a measurable outcome, and a regional operating challenge. The 50% reduction in six months is the headline, but the leadership lesson is more durable. Safety performance improves when executives change what they ask, what they verify, and what they reward.
That is also why the case should not become another isolated success story. A reset earns credibility when its decisions survive contact with the work, its owners are visible, and its evidence remains trustworthy after the celebration ends. Leaders who build that discipline can use a metric as a prompt for better control, rather than as proof that the work is finished.
Headline exists for exactly this kind of discussion, where a documented result becomes a sharper question about leadership, risk, and better workplaces. Listen and join the conversation.
Frequently asked questions
What happened in PepsiCo South America's 180-day safety plan?
Does a 50% accident-ratio reduction prove that safety improved?
What should executives review after a safety metric improves?
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About the author
Andreza Araújo
Safety Culture Expert | Senior EHS Executive
Andreza Araújo is a safety culture expert and senior EHS executive with more than 25 years of experience in environment, health and safety. She is a Civil Engineer and Occupational Safety Engineer from Unicamp, holds a Master's degree in Environmental Diplomacy from the University of Geneva, and completed sustainability studies at IMD Switzerland. Andreza has served in Global Head of EHS roles in Fortune 500 environments, leading cultural transformation programs across multinational operations. She has represented Brazil as a speaker at the United Nations in Paris and has spoken at the International Labour Organization in Turin. She is the author of more than 16 books on safety culture in Portuguese, Spanish, English and German. Her work has earned more than 10 EHS awards, including two recognitions from Indra Nooyi, former PepsiCo CEO.
- Civil & Safety Engineer (Unicamp)
- M.A. Environmental Diplomacy (University of Geneva)
- Sustainability Cert (IMD Switzerland)
- People Management & Coaching (Ohio University)
- UN Paris speaker representative for Brazil
- ILO Turin speaker
- LinkedIn Top Voice
- Indra Nooyi PepsiCo CEO recognition (2x)
Documentaries
Watch Andreza's documentaries
Three productions on safety culture, organizational failure and the human lessons behind major disasters.
Podcasts
Listen to Andreza's podcasts
She hosts three shows on safety leadership, EHS and organizational culture, in English and Portuguese.